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1962] CASE COMMENTS 113
(2) performance of the contract is prohibited by a statute, (3) a con-
dition precedent to the contract has not been fulfilled, or (4) there is
no bona fide dispute.2 9 Also, the arbitration agreement itself must
rest upon sound contract principles.3 0 Nevertheless, should a great por-
tion of common law contract principles be cast away, abrogated or
jeopardized with reference to the "main contract" to give effect to
an arbitration clause which was not or might not have been intended
to have any effect if no legally enforceable contract ever existed be-
tween the parties? To go further, should -the arbitrators have jurisdic-
tion in all cases to make or remake legally unenforceable agreements
into binding contracts? It is true that there are many advantages to
arbitration, 31 especially in today's age of complex commercialism.
Therefore expansion of the arbitrator's jurisdiction is, in many ways,
a desirable end. But it is submitted that a party should not be held to
have waived his right to a judicial determination of his contract un-
less it is clear that he intended to do so. In order to make the inten-
tion clear, lawyers must recognize the need for careful and precise
draftsmanship of commercial contracts.
TIMOTHY G. IRn-ArND
LANDLORD'S FAILURE TO ACT AFTER GIVING NOTICE
TO QUIT
A vague area still existing in the law of landlord and tenant is the
status of a tenant holding over from a periodic term after having been
given a timely and sufficient notice to quit. A question arising in this
situation is whether the landlord, by failing ,to act in regard to the
holding over, must give a second notice to quit in order to maintain
an action of ejectment.
This question recently confronted the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Mack v. Fennell.] Here the landlord, Mack, leased his prem-
ises to Fennell under a written lease tor a term of one month which
2D174 N.E.2d at 465.
OSee note 8 supra.
1 Arbitration has been described as an "easy, expeditious and inexpensive
method of settling disputes, and as tending to prevent litigation." Fudickar v.
Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 399 (1875). For detailed analyses of
the advantages of the arbitration process see Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration
Process, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 631 (1952); Mentschikoff, The Significance of
Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 698 (1952); Taeusch,
Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 147 (1934).
1195 Pa. Super. 5oi, 171 A.2d 844 (1961).
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provided for a tenancy from month to month thereafter, with either
party having the power to terminate the lease by giving thirty days
notice. After the tenant had occupied the premises for several years,
the landlord gave notice on January 17, 1958, that the lease was to be
terminated as of February 28, 1958. The tenant remained on the prop-
erty after the expiration date. Subsequently, on November 29, 1958,
pursuant to the provision in the lease, -the landlord sought to confess
judgment -against the lessee so as to recover possession and the rent
which had accrued during the holding over.
The lower court entered an order striking the confessed judgment.
It took the position -that the lease terminated on February 28, 1958,
and that the landlord's claim thereafter was not for rent, but for dam-
ages for the holding over. It reasoned further that, under a strict
construction, the power to confess judgment for rent did not extend
to the recovery of speculative damages.
2
The landlord appealed, and in a four to one decision the Superior
Court, implying that a tenancy from month to month had arisen
during the holding over, reversed the lower court's decision and held
that the landlord could recover rent and could maintain ejectment.
The landlord was permitted to recover the rent on the theory that
he could elect to treat the holding over as a renewal of the lease for
one month, and 'that he could collect the rent for that month and each
succeeding month until judgment in ejectment was entered. The
court did not mention the theory used in allowing the landlord to
recover possession, since it considered that no problem was involved
there.
The dissent took the view that the landlord could maintain eject-
ment on the basis of the right which accrued on March i, but this
right terminated the tenancy as of that date, so that thereafter the
landlord could only recover damages for the trespassory holding over.
The dissent further suggested that the landlord could have given new
notice and maintained ejectment as of the later date and recovered
rent for the interim period. Assuming, as the majority seems to have
done, that a -tenancy from period to period arose during the interim,
the reasoning of the dissent is quite persuasive.
Doubtless, the landlord could have confessed judgment in eject-
ment and recovered the property immediately upon accrual of the
right, pursuant to the notice, on March 1, 19 5 8.3 The effect of notice to
quit, if properly executed by the landlord, is to terminate the con-
2Polis v. Russell, 161 Pa. Super. 456, 55 A.2d 558 (1947).
3Rice v. Atkinson, 215 Mich. 371, 183 N.W. 762 (1921); See Annot., 19 A.L.R.
1405 (1922).
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tract of lease and the relationship of landlord and tenant thereunder. 4
While the former lease is terminated by the notice, the great weight of
authority holds that the landlord still has an election either to evict
the one holding over or to hold him as a tenant.5 It would be ap-
propriate then to examine the circumstances which give rise to a
tenancy under this doctrine, and to determine the manner in which
that tenancy may thereafter be terminated.
During the interval between the expiration of the periodic tenancy
caused by giving notice to quit, and the time that the landlord makes
his election, it is generally held that the tenant becomes a tenant at
sufferance or a hold over tenant.0 Such a tenancy is based upon the
landlord's failure to eject the wrongful holder immediately after the
expiration of the tenancy.7 This is an estate of indefinite duration from
which a periodic tenancy may evolve.8
A periodic tenancy9 will arise from a tenancy at sufferance if the
landlord has delayed in making his election, and has either expressly
or impliedly consented to the tenant's remaining on the premises' 0
which is a questioi of fact to be decided by the jury." Without the
lessor's assent to the tenancy, the courts have held that no estate from
'Stromberg v. Western Tel. Constr. Co., 86 III. App. 270 (1899).
Providence County Say. Bank v. Hall, 16 R.I. 154, x3 At. 122 (1888). For
additional discussion and cases see l American Law of Property § 3-33 (Casner ed.
1952).
OAt common law, a tenant at sufferance is "one who entered by a lawful de-
mise or title, and after that has ceased, wrongfully continues in possession without
the assent of the person next entitled." Willis v. Harrell, 45 S.E. 794, 118 Ga. 9o6
(igo3). Thus, a tenant for life, for years, or a periodic tenant who holds over without
the consent of his landlord after the estate is brought to an end is a tenant at
sufferance. Arnold Realty Co. v. William K. Toole Co., 46 R.I. 204, 125 Atl. 363
(1924).
71 Tiffany, Real Property § 175 (3d ed. 1939). For additional discussion and
cases see 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 177 (1947).
A number of states have enacted statutes providing that where a tenant holds
over or remains in possession after the expiration of his lease, he shall be deemed
a tenant at sufferance. Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1395, 1398 (1944).
NCrawford v. Jones, 27 Ga. App. 448, io8 S.E. 807 (1921).
""An estate from period to period is an estate which will continue for successive
periods of a year or successive periods of a fraction of a year, unless it is terminated."
Restatement, Property § 20 (1936).
Generally there are three methods by which a periodic tenancy is created: (i)
express agreement that a periodic tenancy shall arise; (2) entry for an indefinite
term with the reservation of a periodic rent; (3) holding over, with the consent of
the landlord, by a lessee in possession after the expiration of a definite term. i
American Law of Property §§ 3.23, 3.26 (Casner ed. 1952).
"3Auto Parts, Inc. v. Jack Smith Beverages, Inc., 3o9 Mich. 735, 16 N.W.2d 141
(1944); 2 Powell, Real Property § 254 (1950). 26 Conn. B.J. 1o3 (1952).
"Wilcox v. Montour Iron & Steel Co., 147 Pa. St. 540, 23 At. 840 (1892).
See i Tiffany, Real Property § 182 (3d ed. 1939).
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period to period may arise, and that the original lease is not revived
by the mere holding over.12
The most obvious methods by which the landlord expressly con-
sents to a tenancy are: to agree to treat the one holding over as a
tenant; 13 to withdraw a notice terminating the lease upon the tenant's
request; 14 to demand or bring suit against the tenant for rent;1 or,
to accept rent from the wrongful holder after the termination of the
lease.' 6 Since the landlord in the Mack case sought rent in arrears, this
act, constituting express consent on the part of the landlord, might
have had the effect of waiving the notice to quit and of continuing
the original tenancy.
Implied consent by the landlord is a more difficult problem. Some
courts have adopted the rule that where the landlord remains silent
as to the holding over, this silence may be construed as an implied ac-
quiescence or assent by the landlord to the tenancy.17 There is an-
other theory closely associated with the idea that silence indicates as-
sent. This is the view that implied consent by the landlord to the
tenant's occupancy may be created ,through -the landlord's failure to
bring action against the tenant or by his apparent lack of objection
to the tenant's holding over.' s This unreasonable delay in ousting the
tenant will warrant an inference that 'the landlord has elected to hold
the tenant for another term.' 9 In addition, various states have passed
statutes holding that the mere giving of a statutory notice to quit
"-See note 8 supra.
IsArcade Invest. Go. v. Gieriet, 99 Minn. 277, ioG9 N.W. 250 09o6); Damascus
Realty Corp. v. Fluss, 133 Misc. 702, 233 N.Y. Supp. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Jawer
v. Barner, 273 Pa. 6, 116 Atl. 520 (1922); 1 American Law of Property § 3.33
(Casner ed. 1952). See Annot., 12o A.L.R. 560 (1939)-
1 4Supplee v. Timothy, 124 Pa. 375, 16 At. 864 (1889).
'5Scott v. Beecher, 91 Mich. 590, 52 N.W. 20 (1892); Conway v. Starkweather,
i Denio 113 (N.Y. 185); Arnold Realty Co. v. William K. Toole Co., 46 R.I. 204,
125 At. 363 (1924).
36Although there are cases to the contrary, the weight of authority holds that the
accepting by the landlord of rent accruing subsequent to the expiration of the
notice to quit constitutes an admission of the tenancy and a waiver of the notice to
quit. Collins v. Canty, 6o Mass. (6 Cush.) 415 (1856); Faraci v. Fassulo, 212 Mich. 216,
18o N.W. 497 (1920); Hobday v. Kane, 114 Va. 398, 76 S.E. 902 (1913). See 1 Tiffany,
Real Property § 183 (3 d ed. 1939). For further discussion and cases see Annot.,
156 A.L.R. 131o (1945); 12o A.L.R. 560 (1939); 64 A.L.R. 309 (1929).
'in this situation the landlord's consent will be considered a tacit renewal
of the lease, and if the original lease was for a periodic tenancy, the new lease will
he on the same periodic basis. Schilling v. Klein, 41 Ill. App. 209 (1891); Irvine v.
Scott, 85 Ky. 260, 3 S.W. 163 (1887); Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio 113 (N.Y.
1845); Arnold Realty Co. v. William K. Toole Co., 46 R.I. 2o4, 125 Atl. 363 (1924).
28Hobbs & Son v. Grand Trunk Ry., 93 Vt. 392, io8 At. 199 (1919).
'"Arnold Realty Co. v. William K. Toole CO., 46 R.I. 204, 125 At. 363 (1924).
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the premises does not terminate the lease, the lease being terminated
only if the notice is acted on.20 Thus, in the Mack case, it would seem
that the original periodic tenancy, if terminated, might have been re-
vived during the landlord's delay of nine months in confessing judg-
ment.
Since either a tenancy at sufferance or the original month to month
tenancy might have existed during the period after the expiration of
the notice to quit in the Mack case, the problem arises as to whether
the landlord must give a second notice to quit before confessing judg-
ment in ejectment. At common law a tenancy at sufferance may be
terminated by the landlord at any time by maintaining an action in
ejectment to recover possession of the premises. 21 Generally no notice
to quit is necessary, 22 since a tenant at sufferance is a holder without
right.2 3 Periodic tenancies, such as those from month to month, which
are to continue for successive periods can only be terminated by a
notice to quit both at common law and by statute.24 Inasmuch as the
court in the Mack case intimated, and the circumstances indicated,
"'There has been a cunflict as to the effect of the landlord's failure to act against
a hold over tenant, but some states have passed statutes binding both parties to
a tenancy where the tenant remains in possession for a period without action by
the landlord. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383.i6o (1953); La. Civ. Code art. 2689 (Dart 1932);
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 228 (1951). These cases construe statutes of this nature:
Phillips-Hollman Inc. v. Peerless Stages, 21o Cal. 253, 291 Pac. 178 (1930); Grand
Cent. Pub. Mkt. v. Kojima, ii Cal. App. 2d 712, 54 P.2d 786 (1936); Hoebel
v. Raymond, 46 Idaho 55, 266 Pac. 433 (1928).
"McLeran v. Benton, 73 Cal. 329, 14 Pac. 879 (1887); Margosian v. Markarian,
288 Mass. 197, 192 N.E. 612 (1934); Guthmann v. Vallery, 51 Neb. 824, 71 NA. 734
(1897); Standard Realty Co. v. Gates, 99 N.J. Eq. 271, 132 Ati. 487 (1926).
=Ibid.
2In some states the necessity of a notice to quit in order to terminate a
tenancy at sufferance is dependent upon the existence of a statute requiring notice.
Under these statutes a timely and sufficient notice to quit must be given to a
tenant at sufferance if the landlord is to be entitled to remedies against him.
D.C. Code § 45-904 (1951)); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383.i6o (1953); La. Civ. Code art.
2689 (Dart 1932); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.060 (1959); N.Y. Real Prop. § 228 (1951);
Wis. Stat. § 234.03 (1957). Cases construing statutes of this type include: Hall,
v. Henninger, 146 Iowa 230, 121 N.W. 6 (19o9); Auto Parts, Inc. v. Jack Smith
Beverages, Inc., 309 Mich. 735, 16 N.W.2d 141 (1944); Arnold Realty Co. v. William
K. Toole, Co., 46 R.I. 204, 125 At. 363 (1924); Hitshew v. Rosson, 41 Wyo. 509,
287 Pac. 316 (103o). Some of these statutes have been modified so as to require a
notice to be given only where the holding over has continued for a length of
time after the expiration of the notice that an implication of assent by the landlord
to the tenancy has been created. N.Y. Real Prop. § 228 (1951); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383-i6o
(1953) (a tenant at sufferance has no right to a notice during the ninety days follow-
ing the expiration of the term).
2Dillon v. Miller, 20o7 Ark. 401, 18o S.W.2d 852 (1944); Demerath v. Schennum,
324 I11. App. 584, 59 N.E.2d 384 (1945); Gaidry's Trustees v. Cooke, 3oi Ky. 216, 191
S.W.2d 390 (1945); Auto Parts, Inc. v. Jack Smith Beverages, Inc., 309 Mich. 735,
16 N.V.2d 141 (1944)-
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that the original month to month tenancy had revived by the hold-
ing over, it would seem that a second notice was necessary in order
for the landlord to confess judgment in ejectment.
The existence of the periodic tenancy would not preclude the land-
lord's right to recover rent in arrears; on the contrary, its existence
appears to be necessary to establish the rental value with sufficient
certainty in order to confess judgment.2 . Thus, the estate necessary
to sustain -the power to confess judgment is the very thing which pre-
vents the action of ejectment.
There is no argument against the landlord's right to recover in
the Mack case if the proper theory is followed. Until the landlord
elects to .treat the holding over as a tenancy, he could confess judg-
ment in ejectment without giving a second notice to quit, and in a
separate action could recover damages2 for the tenant's retention
of the property. However, once -the periodic estate evolved, the land-
lord was required to give a second notice to quit before confessing
judgment in ejectment; whereas, no notice was necessary if he confes-
sed judgment for rent in arrears. As pointed out in the dissent, the
landlord treated the person holding over as a tenant from month to
month to recover rent in arrears, and in the same suit treated her as
a trespasser for his action in ejectment. This procedure violates the
principle that once the landlord has decided to bind the one holding
over as either a tenant or a trespasser, he cannot rescind such elec-
tion.27
RICHARn KELLY WHITE, JR.
•-The landlord may sue for rent only when he has elected to treat the holding
over as a tenancy. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 582 (953)-
nThe damages assessed for the failure of a tenant to surrender possession are to
compensate or indemnify the landlord for having been deprived of the use of the
premises. The damages recoverable in such cases are normally measured by the
reasonable rental value of the property during the time that the person occupying
retained possession. Flournoy v. Everett, 51 Cal. App. 406, 196 Pac. 916 (1921); Martin
v. Clegg, 163 N.C. 528, 79 S.E. io5 (1913). It will be noted that the stipulated rent
does not control in so far as measuring rental value. There are other factors such
as profits which might have been expected, the location of the property, or the
season of the year which may have a bearing on rental value. Buhman v. Nickels
& Brown Bros., 7 Cal. App. 592, 95 Pac. 177 (19o8); Detroit v. Gleason, i16 Mich. 564,
71 N.W. 88o (1898).
2 Goldsborough v. Gable, 140 Ill. 269, 29 N.E. 722 (1892); Walgreen Co. v. Wal-
ton, 16 Tenn. App. 213, 64 S.W.ad 44 (1932).
